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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD A. RICHE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 20477

vs.
NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION, a Utah
Professional Corporat ion,
Defendant and
Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

In referring to the Plaintiff and Respondent, reference
will

state

Appellant,

"RICHE" and
a

Medical

in referring
Professional

to the Defendant and

Corporation,

reference

will be made to "PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION".
1.
fessional

RICHE CONTENDS that all of the issues of the "ProCorporation"

as

is

set

forth

in the Appellant

Brief are contained in the Respondent's Statement of Issues
Presented on Appeal.

(RESP. BR., page 1 and 2)

rROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES

that

the

summary

of

issues are presented in Professional Corporation's original
Appellant

Brief

and

is not

accurately

Statement of Issues set forth by Riche.

restated

under

the

2.

RICHE CONTENDS in his Summary of Issues of Respon-

dent :
"That the Appeal should be dismissed for
the reason that the interlocutory order
is not a final order from which an
Appeal can be taken." (RESP. BR., page
2)
PROFFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES

that

this

Honorable

Court has ruled on the previous motion made by Riche to deny
right of Appeal

to Professional Corporation.

Each of the

parties submitted Memorandum concerning their positions and
this Court made its ruling allowing the filing by the Professional Corporation of its Appellant Brief.
6,

(RESP. BR.,

page

2) were

replied

to

Issues 5 and

in

Appellant's

original Brief and will be additionally referred to in this
Reply Brief.
3.

RICHE CONTENDS

in his Statement of Facts that the

Bankruptcy Court sold the shares of stock in the Corporation
previously owned by Dr. Nilsson to Riche.

(RESP. BR., page

2)
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES
only

the

interest

of

the

Debtor

that

held

by

Riche

purchased

the

Bankruptcy

Court, that the Court sold only its interest, if any, as to
the assets of

the Debtor, and the sale by the Bankruptcy

2

Court did not constitute a sale of shares in the Professional Corporation but only the right of the purchaser (Riche)
to be paid

the sum of $1,000.00, which was the redemption

value by written agreement of the Professional Corporation
with

a

shareholder

as

to

any

disqualified

shareholder.

(APP. BR., page 12-13)
4,

RICHE CONTENDS
to

recover

the purpose of this suit

solution

was

the

Riche.

(RESP. BR., page 3)

value

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES
minor

investment

of

the

that

for dis-

investment

Riche

risked

of

a

in purchasing the assets of the Debtor in

Bankruptcy Court, with complete awareness by Riche and his
counsel, imparted by both the Trustee and the Judge of the
United

States Bankruptcy

Court, that

any purchase

of the

interest of the Court was subject to the "Repurchase Agreement and applicable law"

(R 243) (APP. BR., pages 5 and 6)

and that Riche did not make an investment, but made a gamble
hoping to recover
$400,000.00,

from his minor

investment a windfall of

as alleged in the Argument of Riche in Respon-

dent's Brief under Point One, page 3 thereof.
5.
should

RICHE CONTENDS that dissolution of the corporation
take

assets of

place

first,

together

with

distribution

of

the Professional Corporation to himself and the

3

remaining

doctors

of

the

Medical

Corporation,

and

that

following the sale and division of all of the assets of the
Medical Corporation would be the proper time for this Court
to allow an Appeal

from the Judgment

of the Lower Court.

(RESP. BR., page 3)
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES

that Riche made pre-

vious objection to the allowing of the filing of an Appeal
Brief by the Professional Corporation, and this Court having
read the submitted Briefs ruled that the Professional Corporation had a right to file a Brief now and did not have
wait

until

first

destruction

and division of

and

extinction of

the

to

corporation

its assets, and then be allowed to

have an Appeal.
6.

RICHE CONTENDS that the statute of limitations has

not run, and that
the

statutory

the dissolution suit of Riche is within

period

of

right

of

redemption, and that no

statute of limitations could run while the Trustee of the
Court

was

in possession of

the

interest

of Dr. Nilsson.

(RESP. BR., page 3 and 4)
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES

that

(11 USC Section

541) provides as follows:
(a) The commencement of a case under
Section 301, 302 or 303 of this Title
creates an estate. Such estate is

4

comprised
of
al 1 of
the
fol lowing
property,
wherever
located
and
By
whomever held: (Emphasis added)
(1) Except as provided in Subsections
(b) and (c) (2) of this Section, all
legal or equitable interests of the
Debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
At page

296 of

the 1985 Collier Phamplet Edition of

Bankruptcy Code, Part

I, summarizes Section 541 in detail

and states in part, referring to said Section as follows:
"This Section defines a property of the
estate, and
specifies what property
becomes a property of the estate. The
commencement
of
the bankruptcy case
creates an estate. Under paragraph (1)
of Suosection (a), the estate is comprised of all legal or equitable interest of the Debtor in property, wherever
located, as of the commencement of the
case.
The scope of this paragraph is
broad.
It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible
property, ***"
The right of the bankruptcy estate to all of the assets
of the Debtor, included any interest of the Debtor in the
Professional Corporation and in accordance with Section 541,
supra, all became part of the Debtor's estate and gave to
the Trustee the right to file suit against the Professional
Corporation

to

recover

the

value

Debtor, Dr. Nilsson.

5

of

the

holding

of

the

The Trustee of the Court and IRS both determined that
the Trustee was bound by the "Stock Repurchase Agreement" of
the Professional Corporation, and that the only sum recoverable from the Debtor was the sum of $1,000.00.

(APP. BR.,

pages 21-22-23)
7.

RESPONDENT CONTENDS

on pages

6, 7 and

8 of

its

Brief, citing statute of the State of Utah at 16-11-13, Utah
Code

Annotated,

rights

but

as

amended

completely

1954, as providing

ignoring

Point

One

of

redemption
Appellant's

Brief, which sets forth the statute cited and shows a specific exemption

granted

redemption

shares of a shareholder

ment".

of

by

that

statute

to the purchase or
TT

by private

agree-

(APP. BR., pages 9, 10, 11 and 12)

8.

RESPONDENT CONTENDS that there is no question that

the Appellant had a right to redeem the shares of stock of
the Debtor, Dr. Nilsson, by reason of the private agreement
and then makes allegation that Appellant made no attempt to
redeem the stock during this period.

(RESP. BR., Point Two,

pages 8 and 9)
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES
ignoring
Court

and

the

Respondent

is

the right, title and authority of the Bankrupcty
its Trustee

as

provided

for under

542

11 USC

Section 542 thereof, which vests in the Trustee all property

6

that the Trustee may use, sell or lease under Section 363 to
deliver to the Trustee property of the Debtor and under 11
USC Section 543, requires that the custodian of the property
(the shares possessed by the Debtor) not to make any disbursement

from or take any action in the administration of

property of the Debtor, its proceeds, and requires under (b)
thereof
Debtor

delivery
and

to

the

Trustee

of

there is no authority

the

property

of

the

in the Debtor or in the

Professional Corporation to compel the Trustee to deliver up
the Debtor's property, even though the Professional Corporation has a right of redemption until determination by the
Court as to whether the Court wishes to abandon the property
or

sell

Section

same, and
554

as provided

therefore,

and

under

under

Section 554

(d)

that:

11 USC

"unless

the

Court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not
abandoned under this Section and that is not administered in
the case, remains property of the estate.
Even though a tender was made by the Professional Corporation of $1,000.00, the Bankruptcy Court was not under
compulsion to do other than to offer the property for sale
to the highest bidder, even though

the Court may not have

had any right to deny the reacquisi t ion of the shares by the
Professional Corporation upon tender of the amount set forth

7

in the agreement

between

the parties

as

is set

forth

in

Point Two and Three of Appellant's Brief.
9.
not

RICHE CONTENDS

run until

that the Statute of Limitation did

sale by the Court of whatever

interest

the

Court had in the shares and pre-supposes that the Bankruptcy
Court

and its Trustee did not acquire

Debtor.

the defenses of the

In Section 558 (11 U.S. Section 558 thereof) pro-

vides that:
"The estate shall have the benefit of
any defense available to the Debtor as
against
any
entity other
than the
estate, including statute of limitations, statutes of frauds, usury and
other personal defenses. Waiver oi any
such defense by the Debtor after the
commencement of the case does not bind
the estate."
The Bankruptcy Code further provides under Section 546
11 USC Section 546(a):
"(a)
An action or proceeding under
Section 544, 545, 547, 548 or 553 of
this Title may not be commenced after
the earlier of:
(1) Two years after the appointment of a
Trustee under Section 702, 1104, 1163 or
132 of this Title; or
(2)
The time
dismissed. Tf
The

Court

having

the

case

determined

is
that

closed

or

the

value

of

the

shares was the amount set forth in the Redemption Agreement

8

in the sum of $1,000.00 and same having been tendered to the
Court, did not

bring an action even though the Court was

vested with the shares upon the filing of the Petition in
Bankruptcy, which occurred in 1976.
10.

RICHE CONTENDS in Point Two and Point Three of its

Respondent Brief, pages 8-10 that the Professional Corporation had a right to redemption of shares of stock previously
issued

to a qualified

holder and in Point Three that the

Stock Repurchase Agreement is not an unreasonable restraint
on the alienation of property and then makes allegation at
page 9 of Point Two of Respondent's Brief a ninety (90) day
limitation

on

the

Professional

Corporation

in

which

to

recapture stock held by the Bankruptcy Court or loss of the
stock as set forth in Point Three of Richefs Brief to exercise

a

purchase

by

the

Professional

Corporation

within

ninety (90) days, thereby such failure giving right to order
the liquidation of the corporation.
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION REPLIES

that

the reading of

the statute 16-11-13 Utah Code Annotated as amended 1953 and
as set forth totally in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief,
page 27, the statute specifically refers to the ninety (90)
day

redemption

provision

period,

providing

in the By-laws

that

there

has been no

or a private agreemennt

9

for the

redemption

of shares,

and the Addendum

and appendix to

Appellant!s Brief specifically sets forth the Stock Redemption Agreement

wherein

the Professional Corporation has a

right of redemption of its stock certificate upon disqualification

of a holder

and is therefore

not bound

by the

statutory provision which exempts from the time of limitation a right of redemption entered into by parties who have
subscribed to the Redemption Agreement.
11

•

5i5M^£2EL™£^

in Point

Four, page 10 of Respon-

dent's Brief that Point Four of Appellant's Brief (page 19)
that:
"As a result of his (Riche) dogged
persistence
in purchase
of shares,
attempts to liquidate and obtain a share
of his corporation, he (Riche) is not
guilty of any act giving rise to estoppel."
J^FJ^^ON^^

that Riche was never a

shareholder, never had a right as an owner of the shares of
the Professional

Corporation, and that Riche was never a

"fellow shareholder" in the Professional Corporation as is
fully set forth

in Point Four of AppellantTs Brief, pages

19-24, and the further allegation of Riche

inferring that

Judge Mabey rendered any Judgment as to the merit of Riche's
claim

is evidenced

in the dialogue

between

the Honorable

Judge Ralph R. Mabey and James Z. Davis as Trustee of the
Court, wherein Judge Iviabey stated:
10

TT

I take it that from the argument, as
well, that it would be clear to any
bidder that there is or may be a Repurchase Agreement, which may prohibit
certain transfers or mandate certain
other transfers, and that any purchaser
would take subject to any valid restrictions on the stock. Are there any other
disclosures that need to be made, Mr.
Davis?
Mr. Davis (Trustee):
I don't believe
so. Mr. Sampson is well acquainted with
the documents. I have personally spoken
with his client a couple of days ago and
so advised him, but I do take the possession that I earnestly solicit bids.
If anybody wants to pay more for it,
that is fine with me and the estate."
(R 28-29)
12

-

RI CHE CONTENDS

that

the

ownership

of

the

stock

passed to the Trustee in Bankruptcy, and that the Statute of
Limitation

in

question

is

one

against

the

corporation.

(RESP. BR., page 11).
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION RELIES that Appellant's Reply
Brief, pages

7, 8 and 9 only cover the issues repeatedly

repeated under Respondent's Point Six and Seven of Respondent's Brief, pages 11-13 and does not require repetition by
Appellant.
CONCLUSION
The

Appellant

Corporation

is a Professional

Corpora-

tion, which had a right of redemption by reason of a 1970

11

agreement

entered

into by all of the shareholders, to pur-

chase its corporate stock at a par value of $1.00 per share
for

a

first

total

amount

of $1,000.00, which

sum was

tendered

to the Bankruptcy Court and then bid in open sale of

the stock by the Court fully acquainting any person seeking
to purchase

the assets of

Professional

Corporation) and

subject

the Debtor,
that

(which

is not

the

such purchase would be

to the Redemption Agreement and that the buyer, in

open Court of the shares by Riche, entitled Riche to only
whatever

interest

the Bankruptcy Court had, which was the

sum of $1,000.00, and that Mr. Riche is entitled to the sum
of $1,000.00, which is the value of the shares acquired by
the Court by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act and by the Bankruptcy Code, and did not

give

to tne disqualified buyer,

Riche, the right to be a member of a Professional Corporation and order a dissolution of the corporation, in that a
Stock Repurchase Agreement

is not an unreasonable restraint

on the alienation of property, ana that the Judgment of the
Lower Court should be reversed allowing to the Professional
Corporation

the

right

stock, as provided

to

the

redemption

of its shares of

for in its Stock Repurchase Agreement,

and that the Professional Corporation having been compelled
to defend

itself

against

an action without merit

12

and not

brought or asserted in good faith should be awarded reasonable attorney tees as provided for under 78-27-56 Utah Code
Annotated as amended in 19 81.
Respectfully

submitted

this

25th day of June, 1985.

VLAHOS & SHARP

Attorney
for' Defendant
Appellant

13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Comes now counsel

for the Defendant and Appellant and

certifies to the Court that ten (10) copies of Appellant's
Reply Brief

to

the Brief of the Respondent was posted or

delivered to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah,

332

State

Capitol

Building,

Salt

Lake

City,

Utah

84114, and that four (4) copies were mailed to Plaintiff and
Respondent, by posting same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid

and

Plaintiff
Suite

addressed
and

to John P. Sampson, Esq., attorney for

Respondent,

102, Ogden, Utah

at

2650

84401 on

1985.

14

Washington

Boulevard,

this 25th day of June,

ADDENDUM
See attached Statutes

15

ADDENDUM

18-11-13 (Utah Code Annotated as amended 1953)
PURCHASE OR REDEMPTION OF SHARES OF DECEASED OR
DISQUALIFIED SHAREHOLDER.
The articles of incorporation may provide for the
purchase or redemption of the shares of any shareholder upon the death or disqualification of such
shareholder, or the sane may be provided in the
bylaws or by private agreement. In the absence of
such a provision in the articles of incorporation,
the bylaws, or by private agreement, the professional corporation shall purchase the shares of a
deceased shareholder or a shareholder no longer
qualified to own shares in such corporation within
90 days after tne death of the shareholder or
disqualification of the shareholder, as the case
may be. The price for such share shall be their
reasonable fair value as of the date of death or
disqualification
of the shareholder.
If the
corporation shall fail to purchase said shares by
the end of said 90 days, then the executor or
administrator or other personal representative of
a deceased shareholder or any disqualified shareholder may bring an action in the district court
of the county in which the principal office or
place of practice of the professional corporation
is located for the enforcement of this provision.
The court shall have power to award the plaintiff
the reasonable fair value of his shares, or within
its jurisdiction, may order the liquidation of the
corporation.
Further, if the plaintiff is successful in such action, he shall be entitled to
recover a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.
The professional corporation shall repurchase such
shares without regard to restrictions upon the
repurchase of shares provided by the Utah Business
Coroorat ion Ac t .

27

78-27-54

JUDICIAL CODE

from, any ski area operator for jnjury resulting from any of the inherent risks
of skiing.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 3.
78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing inherent risks and
limitations on liability. Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more
prominent locations within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent
risks of skiing, and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined
in this act.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4.
78-27-55.

Repealed.

Repeal.
Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch. 166, § 5),
relating to notice requirements in case of

injury arising from the inherent risks of
skiing and the statute of limitations on such
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1.

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith.
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the court
may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines
t h a t the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith.
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act relating to attorney's fees; providing that courts may award attorney's fees in
civil actions. — Laws 1981, ch. 13.
78-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state funded agency in action against
state or subdivision — Reimbursement. Any agency or organization receiving
state funds which, as a result of its suing the state, or political subdivision thereof.
receives attorney's fees and costs as ail or part of a settlement or award, shall
forfeit to the general fund, from its appropriated monies, an amount equal to the
attorney's fees received.
History: L. 1981, ch. 155, § 1.

state of attorney's fees received from the
state. — Laws 1981, ch. 155.

Title of Act.
An act relating to state-funded agencies or
organizations; requiring forfeiture to the

PART IV
PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
Chapter
78-30.
78-34.
78-3G.
78-38.
78-45.
78-45b.
78-45c.

Adoption.
Eminent domain.
Forcible entry and detainer.
Nuisance, waste, and other damage.
Uniform civil liability for support act.
Public support of children.
Uniform child custody jurisdiction.
70

est in the property. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 103 S. Ct.
2309, 8 C.B.C.2d 710 (1983).
Because property is broadly defined in section 541 of the Code, an
interest in property consisting of possession and a minute ownership
interest is sufficient to give the bankruptcy court preliminary jurisdiction over such property. Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy
Court, 647 F.2d 768, 4 C.B.C.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 454
U.S. 1162(1982).
Even if funds admittedly due a debtor in possession are subject to
a constructive trust or other equitable claim of supplier of materials,
the debtor in possession retains legal title to the account and it is
therefore part of its estate. Ga. Pacific Corp. v. Sigma Serv. Corp.,
712 P.2d 962, 9 C.B.C.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1983).
A debtor's pre-foreclosure right to redeem certain property is a
property right within section 541 whether it stems from complete
ownership of the underlying property or only of a fractional share.
Harsh Inv. Co. v. Bialac (In re Bialac), 712 F.2d 426, 8 C.B.C.2d
1395 (9th Cir. 1983).
Regardless of a state law prohibition on the assignment of state
pension fund benefits, such benefits may be used in chapter 13 plans
since Congress intended section 541(c)(2), which preserves some nonbankruptcy law restrictions on transfers, to apply only to spendthrift trusts, and not to pension benefits. Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81,
7 C.B.C.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1982).
References
4 Collier on Bankruptcy Ch. 541 (15th ed. 1984).
2 Collier Bankruptcy Manual Ch. 541 (3d ed. 1984).
Comment, A System of Marshaling Estate Assets, 25 P r a c . Law
53(1979).
Note, Debtor-Creditor—The After-Acquired Property Clause and
Inconsistent State Disclosure—Anderson v. Southern Discount
Co., 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 797 (1979).
SECTION 542 (11 U.S.C. § 542)
§ 542. Turnover of property to the estate.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this sec
tion, an entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody
or control, during the case, of property that the trustee ma;
use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that th
debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall delive
to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value c
such property, unless such property is of inconsequential vak
or benefit to the estate.

307

CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND ESTATE

§ 543

sett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.), 670 F.2d 383, 5 C.B.C.2d
1252 (2d Cir. 1982).
References
4 Collier on Bankruptcy Ch. 542 (15th ed. 1984).
2 Collier Bankruptcy Manual Ch. 542 (3d ed. 1984).
3 Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide Ch. 62 (1984).
Comment, The Legal Standard for a § 542(a) Turnover, 1983 Ann.
Surv. Bankr. L. 265.
Landley, United States v. Whiting Pools, 674 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.
1982): An Analysis of a Debtor's Right to Turnover Order
Against the IRS, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 141 (1983).
Levit, Use and Disposition of Property Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code: Some Practical Concerns, 53 Am. Bankr.
L.J. 275 (1979).
Malpass, A Bankruptcy Debtor's Right to Turnover of Property
Held by Creditors: A Perspective on Section 542 and 543 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 85 Com. L.J. 242 (1983).
Sauder, Bankruptcy and Turnover Proceedings Against the I.R.S.:
A Path Toward Reorganization and Rehabilitation Fraught with
Pitfalls, 4 Whittier L. Rev. 87 (1982).
SECTION 543 (11 TJ.S.C. § 543)

§ 543. Turnover of property by a custodian.
(a) A custodian with knowledge of the commencement of a
case under this title concerning the debtor may not make any
disbursement from, or take any action in the administration
of, property of the debtor, proceeds, product, offspring, rents,
or profits of such property, or property of the estate, in the
possession, custody, or control of such custodian, except such
action as is necessary to preserve such property.
(b) A custodian shall—
(1) deliver to the trustee any property of the debtor held
by or transferred to such custodian, or proceeds,product,
offspring, rents, or profits of such property, that is in
such custodian's possession, custody, or control on the
date that such custodian acquires knowledge of the commencement of the case; and

§ 543

BANKRUPTCY CODE

308

(2) file an accounting of any property of the debtor, or
proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such
property that, at any time, came into the possession, custody, or control of such custodian.
(c) The court, after notice and a hearing, shall—
(1) protect all entities to which a custodian has become
obligated with respect to such property or proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such property;
(2) provide for the payment of reasonable compensation
for services rendered and costs and expenses incurred by
. such custodian; and
(3) surcharge such custodian, other than an assignee for
the benefit of the debtor's creditors that was appointed or
took possession more than 120 days before the date of the
filing of the petition, for any improper or excessive disbursement, other than a disbursement that has been made
in accordance with applicable law or that has been approved, after notice and a hearing, by a court of competent
jurisdiction before the commencement of the case under
this title.
(d) After notice and hearing, the bankruptcy court—
(1) may excuse compliance with subsection (a), (b), or
(c) of this section, if the interests of creditors and, if the
debtor is not insolvent, of equity security holders would be
better served by permitting a custodian to continue in
possession, custody, or control of such property, and
(2) shall excuse compliance with subsections (a) and
(b)( 1) of this section if the custodian is an assignee for the
benefit of the debtor's creditors that was appointed or
took possession more than 120 days before the date of the
filing of the petition, unless compliance with such subsections is necessary to prevent fraud or injustice.
Legislative History
This section requires a custodian appointed before the bankruptcy
case to deliver to the trustee and to account for property that has
come into his possession, custody, or control as a custodian. "Property of the debtor" in section (a) includes property that was propertv
of the debtor at the time the custodian took the propertv, but the title
to which passed to the custodian. The section requires the court to
protect any obligations incurred by the custodian, provide for the
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graph (2) to subsection (d) excusing an assignee for the benefit of
creditors who was appointed or who took possession more than 120
days prior to the filing of the petition, from compliance with subsections (a) and (b)(1), unless fraud or injustice would result.
Case Annotations
Although section 543 generally requires a custodian of the debtor's
property to turn over such property to the trustee, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) is not required to turn over property it had
seized pursuant to a tax claim prior to the time the debtor's bankruptcv petition was filed, because in such a situation the IRS is not a
custodian. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2309, 8
C.B.C.2d 710 (1983).
Because it is not a "custodian" under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978,
a secured creditor, who prior to the debtor's filing under chapter 13,
repossesses property of a debtor as permitted by the state statute is
not required to deliver possession of the property to the trustee in
accordance with section 543(b). Flournev v. Citv Fin. of Columbus,
Inc., 679 F.2d 821, 6 C.B.C.2d 965 (11th Cir. 1982).
Funds held in trust by a state appointed custodian for the benefit
of one class of creditors of a corporate debtor, including funds diverted to the trust both pre- and post-petition, are subject to turnover as property of the estate regardless of any state statute permitting the beneficiaries to be paid from the trust account. McClanahan
v. Metropolitan Adjustment Bureau (In re Metropolitan Adjustment Bureau), 6 C.B.C.2d 1402 (9th Cir., B.A.P., 1982).
References
4 Collier on Bankruptcy Ch. 543 (15th ed. 1984).
2 Collier Bankruptcy Manual Ch. 543 (3d ed. 1984).
3 Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide Ch. 62 (1984).
SECTION 544 (11 U.S.C. § 544)
§ 544. Trustee as lien creditor and as successor to certain
creditors and purchasers.
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the
case, and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of
any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable by—
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the
time of the commencement of the case, and that obtains, at
such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on
all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could
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have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a
creditor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the
time of the commencement of the case, and obtains, at such
time and with respect to such credit, an execution against
the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such time,
whether or not such a creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than
fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law
permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the
status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such
transfer at the time of the commencement of the case,
whether or not such a purchaser exists.
(b) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor
that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an
unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title
or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
Legislative H i s t o r y
Subsection (a) is the "strong arm clause" of current law, now.
found in Bankruptcy x\ct section 70c. It gives the trustee the rights
of a creditor on a simple contract with a judicial lien on the property
of the debtor as of the date of the petition; of a creditor with a writ of
execution against the property of the debtor unsatisfied as of the
date of the petition: and a bona fide purchaser of the real property of
the debtor as of the date of the petition. "Simple contract" as used
here is derived from Bankruptcy Act section 60a(4). The third status, that of a bona fide purchaser of real property, is new.
[House Report Sro. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 370 (1977); Senate Report Xo. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1973).]
Section 544(a)(3) modifies similar provisions contained in the
House bill and Senate amendment so as not to require a creditor to
perform the impossible, m order to perfect his interest. Both the lien
creditor test in section 544(a)( 1), and the bona fide purchaser test in
section 544(a)(3) should not require a transferee to perfect a transfer against an entity with respect which applicable law tioes not permit perfection. The avoiding powers under section 544(a)(1). (2),
and (3) are new. In particular, section 544(a)(1) overrules Pacific
Finance Corp. v. Edwards. 309 F.2d '224 (9th f i r . 1962). and In re
Federals. Inc., 5o3 F.2d 509 (6th f i r . L977), insofar as those cases
held that tiie trustee did not have the status of a creditor who extended credit immediately prior to the commencement of the case.
[124 Cong. Rec. H 11.097 (Sept. 28. 1978); S 17.413 (Oct. t>, 1973).]
Subjection (b) is derived from current section 70e. It j^ives the

